CVE-2026-15890

Description

The default AEAD nonce provider for the PSA Internal Trusted Storage transform module, secure_storage_its_transform_aead_get_nonce() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/transform/aead_get.c, stores its nonce counter in unsynchronized function-local static variables (s_nonce and s_nonce_initialized). Every ITS write obtains its AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce here via secure_storage_its_transform_to_store(). Because the function held no lock, two threads calling it concurrently race on the shared statics: the initialization path (psa_generate_random() followed by memcpy()) and the non-atomic increment-then-copy path can each hand the same nonce value to two distinct encryption operations, and can lose increments so the counter repeats values it was designed never to repeat. The ITS layer (secure_storage_its_set() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/implementation.c) performs no serialization of its own, so concurrent same-UID writes reach the racy provider directly. Reusing a nonce with the same key under AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a catastrophic AEAD failure: it leaks the XOR of the two plaintexts (ITS routinely stores secrets, including PSA persistent keys) and, for GCM, exposes the authentication key, enabling forgery of stored entries. Because the AEAD key is derived per entry UID, the security-relevant collision is two concurrent writes to the same UID both receiving the same nonce; an adversary able to read the raw backing storage can then exploit the reuse. Both ITS store back-ends shipped with Zephyr, zms.c and the settings/NVS back-end in settings.c, are log-structured flash stores with deferred garbage collection, so an entry superseded by a rewrite remains physically present in the partition until its sector is reclaimed. Two same-UID writes that race therefore leave both ciphertexts readable in the raw image at once, which is the condition the nonce reuse needs to be exploitable. The trigger remains narrow: both built-in key providers (DEVICE_ID_HASH and ENTRY_UID_HASH) salt the derived key with the entry UID, so reuse across different UIDs is harmless, and the exposure requires an application that writes the same UID concurrently from two threads. The fix serializes the provider with a K_MUTEX_DEFINE(s_nonce_mutex) held for the duration of nonce generation.

Overview

State: PUBLISHED
Assigner (CNA): zephyr
CVSS severity: MEDIUM
CVSS score: 5.3 / 10
CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Effective score: 5.3 / 10 MEDIUM source: CNA overview
CWE(s): CWE-323, CWE-362
Reserved: 2026-07-15
Published: 2026-09-21 21:16 UTC
Last updated: 2026-09-21 21:16 UTC
Source: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/15xxx/CVE-2026-15890.json

NVD triage scoring NVD CVE 2.0

Layer NVD adds on top of the CNA's CVE record — published / last-modified timestamps, exploitability / impact subscores, and the FIRST.org EPSS probability that this CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days.

NVD published: 2026-09-21 22:16:56 UTC
NVD last modified: 2026-09-21 22:16:56 UTC
NVD CVSS v3.1: 5.3 / 10 MEDIUM source: vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org
NVD CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Exploitability subscore: 1.0 / 10
Impact subscore: 4.2 / 10

European Union Vulnerability Database ENISA EUVD

ENISA's official EU repository for curated vulnerability intelligence. Carries a separate identifier (EUVD-YYYY-NNNN) and frequently exposes an earlier-published description + CVSS than NVD does.

EUVD ID: EUVD-2026-84178
Assigner: zephyr
Published: Sep 21, 2026, 9:16:04 PM
Updated: Sep 21, 2026, 9:16:04 PM
EUVD base score (CVSS 3.1): 5.3 / 10
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
EUVD-reported EPSS: 0.0000
Vendors: zephyrproject
Products: Zephyr (4.4.0 <4.4.2)

Zephyr (4.0.0 <4.3.2)

ENISA description: The default AEAD nonce provider for the PSA Internal Trusted Storage transform module, secure_storage_its_transform_aead_get_nonce() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/transform/aead_get.c, stores its nonce counter in unsynchronized function-local static variables (s_nonce and s_nonce_initialized). Every ITS write obtains its AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce here via secure_storage_its_transform_to_store(). Because the function held no lock, two threads calling it concurrently race on the shared statics: the initialization path (psa_generate_random() followed by memcpy()) and the non-atomic increment-then-copy path can each hand the same nonce value to two distinct encryption operations, and can lose increments so the counter repeats values it was designed never to repeat. The ITS layer (secure_storage_its_set() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/implementation.c) performs no serialization of its own, so concurrent same-UID writes reach the racy provider directly. Reusing a nonce with the same key under AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a catastrophic AEAD failure: it leaks the XOR of the two plaintexts (ITS routinely stores secrets, including PSA persistent keys) and, for GCM, exposes the authentication key, enabling forgery of stored entries. Because the AEAD key is derived per entry UID, the security-relevant collision is two concurrent writes to the same UID both receiving the same nonce; an adversary able to read the raw backing storage can then exploit the reuse. Both ITS store back-ends shipped with Zephyr, zms.c and the settings/NVS back-end in settings.c, are log-structured flash stores with deferred garbage collection, so an entry superseded by a rewrite remains physically present in the partition until its sector is reclaimed. Two same-UID writes that race therefore leave both ciphertexts readable in the raw image at once, which is the condition the nonce reuse needs to be exploitable. The trigger remains narrow: both built-in key providers (DEVICE_ID_HASH and ENTRY_UID_HASH) salt the derived key with the entry UID, so reuse across different UIDs is harmless, and the exposure requires an application that writes the same UID concurrently from two threads. The fix serializes the provider with a K_MUTEX_DEFINE(s_nonce_mutex) held for the duration of nonce generation.

EUVD references (2)

Affected products (1)

Vendor	Product	Versions	Platforms
zephyrproject	zephyr	`4.0.0` (affected), `4.4.0` (affected)	—

Vendor references (2)

References embedded in the original CVE record by the assigning CNA.

Fix commit patch
GHSA-23jw-7xv2-xr28

Web references (0)

DuckDuckGo results ranked by threat-intel / vendor advisory domains. Generated by the 🔎 Find references (web) button above — same flow as the Remediations search.

No web references attached yet.

NVD-tagged references (2)

Reference list NVD curates from the CNA record, vendor advisories, and third-party reports. The tag chips below are NVD's analyst-assigned categories.

https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/dc66397309248271df1fd0131d68ce8ea62bf91b vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-23jw-7xv2-xr28 vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org

Remediations (10)

CVE-2026-15890 - Vulnerability Details - OpenCVE

web:app.opencve.io

The fix serializes the provider with a K_MUTEX_DEFINE (s_nonce_mutex) held for the duration of nonce generation. Show moreShow less Published: 2026 -09-21 Score:5.3 Medium EPSS:n/a KEV:No Impact:n/a Action:n/a

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
CVE-2026-15890 - AEAD nonce reuse in Zephyr secure_storage ITS default ...

web:cvefeed.io

The following list is the news that have been mention CVE-2026-15890 vulnerability anywhere in the article. Results are limited to the first 20 news articles due to potential performance issues. EPSS is a daily estimate of the probability of exploitation activity being observed over the next 30 days.

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
CVE-2026-15890: Zephyrproject Zephyr Vulnerability | CVETodo

web:cvetodo.com

CVE-2026-15890 is a CVSS 5.3 medium-severity vulnerability in Zephyr. Full technical analysis, mitigations , and exploit status — updated in real time.

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
Security Update Guide - Microsoft

web:msrc.microsoft.com

The Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) investigates all reports of security vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft products and services, and provides the information here as part of the ongoing effort to help you manage security risks and help keep your systems protected.

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of September 16, 2026 ...

web:sec.cloudapps.cisco.com

On September 16, 2026 , the Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) published the advisories that are listed in the following tables. To remediate these vulnerabilities, Cisco strongly recommends that customers upgrade to the fixed software that is indicated in the advisories. For more information about changes in Cisco PSIRT vulnerability disclosure, see Strengthening the ...

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
Microsoft Patch Tracker (September 2026): Exploit-Ranked | Senserva

web:senserva.com

Every Microsoft security patch (KB) and the CVEs it fixes, with severity, CVSS, and CISA KEV status. Cross-linked to the CVE reference.

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
Description of the security update for Excel 2016: August 11, 2026 ...

web:support.microsoft.com

Note To apply this security update, you must have the release version of Excel 2016 installed on the computer.

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
CVE-2026-15890 - vulnerability database | Vulners.com

web:vulners.com

CVE-2026-15890 🗓️ 21 Sep 2026 14:16:04 Reported by zephyr Type cve 🔗 web.nvd.nist.gov 👁 9 Views

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - July 2026

web:www.oracle.com

This Critical Patch Update contains 1448 new security patches across the product families listed below. Please note that a My Oracle Support (MOS) note summarizing the content of this Critical Patch Update and other Oracle Software Security Assurance activities is located at July 2026 Critical Patch Update: Executive Summary and Analysis.

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC
CVE-2026-15890: zephyrproject zephyr: The default AEAD nonce ... - Rapid7

web:www.rapid7.com

CVE-2026-15890 : zephyrproject zephyr: The default AEAD nonce provider for the PSA Internal Trusted Storage transform module,…. View severity, references, and remediation details from Rapid7.

2026-09-22 17:11 UTC

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Raw JSON

The full cvelistV5 record. Download as CVE-2026-15890.json.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "zephyr",
          "product": "zephyr",
          "programFiles": [
            "subsys/secure_storage/src/its/transform/aead_get.c"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "secure_storage_its_transform_aead_get_nonce"
            }
          ],
          "vendor": "zephyrproject",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4.3.2",
              "status": "affected",
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              "versionType": "semver"
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        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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              "lang": "en",
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-21T21:16:04.169Z",
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        },
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          "url": "https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-23jw-7xv2-xr28"
        }
      ],
      "title": "AEAD nonce reuse in Zephyr secure_storage ITS default nonce provider due to missing thread synchronization",
      "x_generator": {
        "engine": "cvelib 1.8.0"
      }
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
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    "datePublished": "2026-09-21T21:16:04.169Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-15T17:38:06.560Z",
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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