CVE-2026-96455

Description

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.

Overview

State: PUBLISHED
Assigner (CNA): JFROG
CVSS severity: HIGH
CVSS score: 8.8 / 10
CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Effective score: 8.8 / 10 HIGH source: CNA overview
CWE(s): CWE-306, CWE-494
Reserved: 2026-09-23
Published: 2026-09-23 10:01 UTC
Last updated: 2026-09-23 13:59 UTC
Source: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/96xxx/CVE-2026-96455.json
Linked Threat: CVE-2026-96455 — Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint

NVD triage scoring NVD CVE 2.0

Layer NVD adds on top of the CNA's CVE record — published / last-modified timestamps, exploitability / impact subscores, and the FIRST.org EPSS probability that this CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days.

NVD published: 2026-09-23 11:17:18 UTC
NVD last modified: 2026-09-23 19:42:02 UTC
NVD CVSS v3.1: 8.8 / 10 HIGH source: reefs@jfrog.com
NVD CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Exploitability subscore: 2.8 / 10
Impact subscore: 5.9 / 10

European Union Vulnerability Database ENISA EUVD

ENISA's official EU repository for curated vulnerability intelligence. Carries a separate identifier (EUVD-YYYY-NNNN) and frequently exposes an earlier-published description + CVSS than NVD does.

EUVD ID: EUVD-2026-85185
Assigner: JFROG
Published: Sep 23, 2026, 10:01:15 AM
Updated: Sep 23, 2026, 1:59:45 PM
EUVD base score (CVSS 3.1): 8.8 / 10
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EUVD-reported EPSS: 0.0000
Vendors: Pollen Robotics
Products: Reachy Mini (0 ≤1.11.0)
Aliases: GHSA-8w3q-4cmj-h32j

ENISA description: The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.

EUVD references (5)

Affected products (1)

Vendor	Product	Versions	Platforms
Pollen Robotics	Reachy Mini	`0` (affected)	Linux

Vendor references (5)

References embedded in the original CVE record by the assigning CNA.

Reachy Mini product
apps.py - install_app has no authentication dependency product
main.py - _resolve_bind_host binds 0.0.0.0 on the wireless version product
PR #1207 - CORS restricted to localhost (does not address this issue) patch
reachy_mini v1.11.0 - latest release, still affected release-notes

Web references (0)

DuckDuckGo results ranked by threat-intel / vendor advisory domains. Generated by the 🔎 Find references (web) button above — same flow as the Remediations search.

No web references attached yet.

NVD-tagged references (5)

Reference list NVD curates from the CNA record, vendor advisories, and third-party reports. The tag chips below are NVD's analyst-assigned categories.

https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/pull/1207 reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/releases/tag/v1.11.0 reefs@jfrog.com

Remediations (10)

Remediations are stored against the linked Threat row; the list below is deduplicated across both pages.

July 2026 Critical Patch Update Released | security - Oracle Blogs

web:blogs.oracle.com

For more information about the Critical Patch Update program, see the security vulnerability remediation practices page located on the Oracle Trust Center.

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
Security Update Guide - Microsoft

web:msrc.microsoft.com

The Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) investigates all reports of security vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft products and services, and provides the information here as part of the ongoing effort to help you manage security risks and help keep your systems protected.

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
Cisco Advance Notification for Publication of September 16, 2026 ...

web:sec.cloudapps.cisco.com

On September 16, 2026 , the Cisco Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) published the advisories that are listed in the following tables. To remediate these vulnerabilities, Cisco strongly recommends that customers upgrade to the fixed software that is indicated in the advisories. For more information about changes in Cisco PSIRT vulnerability disclosure, see Strengthening the ...

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
Microsoft Patch Tracker (September 2026): Exploit-Ranked | Senserva

web:senserva.com

Every Microsoft security patch (KB) and the CVEs it fixes, with severity, CVSS, and CISA KEV status. Cross-linked to the CVE reference.

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
CVE-2026-96455 - vulnerability database | Vulners.com

web:vulners.com

The Reachy Mini daemon is vulnerable to unauthenticated remote code execution due to a missing authentication check on its app installation endpoint (POST /apps/install ). An attacker on the same local network can exploit this by providing a body ...

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
CVE-2026-45585 BitLocker Bypass Fixed in June 2026 Updates

web:windowsforum.com

Microsoft tracked YellowKey as CVE - 2026 -45585 and initially issued a mitigation while it prepared a full update. The important date for administrators is June 9, 2026 : Microsoft included a fix in its June Patch Tuesday security releases.

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - April 2026

web:www.oracle.com

This Critical Patch Update contains 481 new security patches across the product families listed below. Please note that an MOS note summarizing the content of this Critical Patch Update and other Oracle Software Security Assurance activities is located at April 2026 Critical Patch Update: Executive Summary and Analysis.

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - July 2026

web:www.oracle.com

This Critical Patch Update contains 1448 new security patches across the product families listed below. Please note that a My Oracle Support (MOS) note summarizing the content of this Critical Patch Update and other Oracle Software Security Assurance activities is located at July 2026 Critical Patch Update: Executive Summary and Analysis.

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
July Patch RoguePlanet Tuesday Kills Windows Kerberos RC4 Rollback ...

web:www.techtimes.com

July 2026 Patch Tuesday permanently removes the Kerberos RC4 rollback registry key on July 14, leaving service accounts with RC4-only material unable to authenticate. Administrators must also ...

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC
Patch Tuesday September 2026: Security Updates & CVE Analysis

web:zecurit.com

Get the complete breakdown of Microsoft's September 2026 Patch Tuesday. We analyze the latest security updates and all critical CVEs .

2026-09-24 11:07 UTC

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Raw JSON

The full cvelistV5 record. Download as CVE-2026-96455.json.

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