CVE-2026-96456

Description

The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication. The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other. Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced. This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.

Overview

State: PUBLISHED
Assigner (CNA): JFROG
CVSS severity: MEDIUM
CVSS score: 6.3 / 10
CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
Effective score: 6.3 / 10 MEDIUM source: CNA overview
CWE(s): CWE-362, CWE-287
Reserved: 2026-09-23
Published: 2026-09-23 10:03 UTC
Last updated: 2026-09-23 13:58 UTC
Source: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/96xxx/CVE-2026-96456.json

NVD triage scoring NVD CVE 2.0

Layer NVD adds on top of the CNA's CVE record — published / last-modified timestamps, exploitability / impact subscores, and the FIRST.org EPSS probability that this CVE will be exploited in the wild in the next 30 days.

NVD published: 2026-09-23 11:17:18 UTC
NVD last modified: 2026-09-23 19:42:02 UTC
NVD CVSS v3.1: 6.3 / 10 MEDIUM source: reefs@jfrog.com
NVD CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
Exploitability subscore: 2.1 / 10
Impact subscore: 3.7 / 10

European Union Vulnerability Database ENISA EUVD

ENISA's official EU repository for curated vulnerability intelligence. Carries a separate identifier (EUVD-YYYY-NNNN) and frequently exposes an earlier-published description + CVSS than NVD does.

EUVD ID: EUVD-2026-85186
Assigner: JFROG
Published: Sep 23, 2026, 10:03:06 AM
Updated: Sep 23, 2026, 1:58:37 PM
EUVD base score (CVSS 3.1): 6.3 / 10
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L
EUVD-reported EPSS: 0.0000
Vendors: Pollen Robotics
Products: Reachy Mini (0 ≤1.11.0)
Aliases: GHSA-w8hv-46m4-pm2j

ENISA description: The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication. The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other. Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced. This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.

EUVD references (5)

Affected products (1)

Vendor	Product	Versions	Platforms
Pollen Robotics	Reachy Mini	`0` (affected)	Linux

Vendor references (5)

References embedded in the original CVE record by the assigning CNA.

GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf vendor-advisory
Reachy Mini product
bluetooth_service.py - WriteValue ignores the caller identity in options product
CVE-2026-62661 - Bluetooth command handler path traversal (step 3 of the chain) related
CVE-2026-55419 - unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API (step 1 of the chain) related

Web references (0)

DuckDuckGo results ranked by threat-intel / vendor advisory domains. Generated by the 🔎 Find references (web) button above — same flow as the Remediations search.

No web references attached yet.

NVD-tagged references (5)

Reference list NVD curates from the CNA record, vendor advisories, and third-party reports. The tag chips below are NVD's analyst-assigned categories.

https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py reefs@jfrog.com
https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/security/advisories/GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf reefs@jfrog.com
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55419 reefs@jfrog.com
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62661 reefs@jfrog.com

Remediations (10)

Microsoft Defender Patch Bypass: High Severity Zero-Day Privilege ...

web:arcticwolf.com

Validate Group Policy and registry settings for Defender to ensure real-time protection, automatic remediation , and exclusion policies are secured. Temporary Workarounds Block Vulnerable Apps: Use Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management to block or warn against execution of affected binaries for systems pending a patch .

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
Microsoft Update Catalog

web:catalog.update.microsoft.com

Welcome to the Microsoft Update Catalog site. We want your feedback! Visit our newsgroup or send us an email to provide us with your thoughts and suggestions. To get started using the site, enter in your search terms in the Search box above or visit our FAQ for search tips. |Newsgroup|Send us your feedback

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
Defender Zero-Day CVE-2026-50656 Under Active Exploit, No Patch

web:dailysecurityreview.com

Microsoft confirmed CVE - 2026 -50656, a zero-day in the Defender Malware Protection Engine allowing SYSTEM-level privilege escalation, is under active exploitation with no patch currently available.

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
Security Update Guide - Microsoft

web:msrc.microsoft.com

The Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) investigates all reports of security vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft products and services, and provides the information here as part of the ongoing effort to help you manage security risks and help keep your systems protected.

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center

web:msrc.microsoft.com

Security Update Guide - Microsoft Security Response Center

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
Microsoft Patch Tracker (September 2026): Exploit-Ranked | Senserva

web:senserva.com

Every Microsoft security patch (KB) and the CVEs it fixes, with severity, CVSS, and CISA KEV status. Cross-linked to the CVE reference.

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
What Is CVE Remediation in 2026? - aikido.dev

web:www.aikido.dev

CVE remediation is fixing known flaws in the software you run. Why upgrading often fails, what remediation actually involves, and how backporting fixes it.

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
Critical Patches Issued for Microsoft Products, July 14, 2026

web:www.cisecurity.org

Microsoft reports CVE - 2026 -56164 has been exploited in the wild. CVE - 2026 -56164 may allow remote cyber threat actors to gain unauthorized access to on-premises SharePoint Server instances. Microsoft noted that integrating its Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) can provide temporary mitigation by actively scanning and detecting malicious POST requests associated with exploitation attempts. The ...

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
July Patch RoguePlanet Tuesday Kills Windows Kerberos RC4 Rollback ...

web:www.techtimes.com

July 2026 Patch Tuesday permanently removes the Kerberos RC4 rollback registry key on July 14, leaving service accounts with RC4-only material unable to authenticate. Administrators must also ...

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC
Patch Tuesday September 2026: Security Updates & CVE Analysis

web:zecurit.com

Get the complete breakdown of Microsoft's September 2026 Patch Tuesday. We analyze the latest security updates and all critical CVEs .

2026-09-24 11:44 UTC

AI Forensic Analysis

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Raw JSON

The full cvelistV5 record. Download as CVE-2026-96456.json.

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