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TF-1933922 high

📛 Threat Title

Unknown Loader: Domain name that delivers a malware payload wsyachtteakcarpentry.com

Category: Unknown Loader Published: Source updated: First seen: Last updated: Source: ThreatFox IOCs

Description

Indicator that identifies a malware distribution server (payload delivery). IOC type: Domain name that delivers a malware payload. Attributed malware: Unknown Loader. Confidence: 75. First seen: 2026-09-25 16:07:38 UTC. Reporter: varysz. Tags: etherhiding, victim.

Indicators of Compromise (1)

Each indicator is enriched from the IOC database, threat-intel feed corroboration (Threat Hunt) and VirusTotal. Click one to expand.

domain wsyachtteakcarpentry.com VT 3 / 91 UrlVoid 3 / 36

IOC database

Type
domain
Value
wsyachtteakcarpentry.com
First seen
Last seen
Attached to this threat
Appears in
1 threat
Description
Ingested from IOC source: https://threatfox.abuse.ch/downloads/hostfile/

Open the full IOC page →

Threat Hunt — feed corroboration

Not present in any configured threat-intel feed.

Flagged by 3 of 91 VirusTotal vendors

VendorVerdictDetection
CRDF malicious malicious
Gridinsoft suspicious suspicious
SOCRadar suspicious suspicious

Details From VirusTotal

Basic Properties
RegistrarLaunchpad.com Inc.
TLDcom
History
Creation date2013-03-04 19:40 UTC
Last analysis2026-09-25 17:17 UTC
Last modified on VirusTotal2026-09-25 23:58 UTC
Last WHOIS update2026-02-17 08:46 UTC
WHOIS record date2026-09-25 10:01 UTC

References (2)

  • Malpedia profile ThreatFox IOCs
  • ThreatFox IOC page ThreatFox IOCs

    Indicator that identifies a malware distribution server (payload delivery). IOC type: Domain name that delivers a malware payload. Attributed malware: Unknown Loader. Confidence: 75. First seen: 2026-09-25 16:07:38 UTC. Reporter: varysz. Tags: etherhiding, victim.

Remediations (10)

  • web:darkwebinformer.com

    A new domain -based indicator has been identified associated with payload delivery activity tied to the malware unknown_loader . This domain , advertised under the guise of a mobile advertising and monetization platform, poses a high-confidence threat to users and organizations.

  • web:reliaquest.com

    "DeepLoad" malware has arrived in enterprise environments via "ClickFix" delivery, turning one user action into rapid, fileless compromise. It likely uses AI-assisted obfuscation and process injection to evade static scanning, while credential theft starts immediately and captures passwords and sessions even if the primary loader is ...

  • web:socprime.com

    DeepLoad is a fileless malware family distributed through ClickFix social engineering. It relies on an obfuscated PowerShell loader , in-memory shellcode injection into trusted Windows processes, and AI-generated "noise" to reduce static-detection fidelity.

  • web:thehackernews.com

    WordlistLoader delivers Amatera via ClearFake ClickFix attacks, while SynkLoader uses Teams phishing to steal Windows login credentials.

  • web:thehackernews.com

    The payload is gated on machine identity The third finding is the one that should change how teams interpret their tooling. In the dropper recovered from the live host, a hardware and account fingerprint machine GUID, volume serial, computer name , BIOS manufacturer, system model, GPU and username is base64-encoded directly into the download path.

  • web:www.csoonline.com

    The WordPress ClickFix campaign delivers three separate infostealer payloads — two of them previously unknown — and uses domain infrastructure that appears to have been set up since July 2025.

  • web:www.elastic.co

    Elastic Security Labs detected a surge in ClickFix campaigns, using GHOSTPULSE to deploy Remote Access Trojans and data-stealing malware .

  • web:www.malwarebytes.com

    We uncovered ClickFix attacks using fake Google and Cloudflare pages to deliver everything from infostealers to a newly discovered malware loader .

  • web:www.microsoft.com

    The retrieved content is executed directly in memory. Steganography-based payload delivery A notable technique in this campaign is the use of steganography to conceal malicious content inside a publicly hosted image. Instead of downloading a secondary script ( as in Campaign 1), the malware retrieves a JPEG image from an image-hosting service.

  • web:www.microsoft.com

    An active campaign is impersonating legitimate software vendors to deliver malware through look-alike download pages and regenerated installer archives. Microsoft Defender Experts shares observed attack techniques, Defender XDR detections, indicators of compromise, and practical mitigations to help organizations identify, block, and respond to this threat.

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