CVE-2026-87119

Reference list NVD curates from the CNA record, vendor advisories, and third-party reports. The tag chips below are NVD's analyst-assigned categories.

• https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
• https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
• https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
• https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-p9fv-9w58-95x2 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
• https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db

The full cvelistV5 record. Download as CVE-2026-87119.json.

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-87119",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-22T12:02:12.184296Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization'",
            "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription'"
          ],
          "packageName": "mpp",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
          "product": "mpp",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex",
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':verify/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':wallet_params/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':from_rpc/1"
            },
            {
              "name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription':verify/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
          "vendor": "ZenHive",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "0.16.2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0.14.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://github.com",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization'",
            "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription'"
          ],
          "packageName": "zenhive/mpp",
          "packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp",
          "product": "mpp",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex",
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"
          ],
          "programRoutines": [
            {
              "name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':verify/3"
            },
            {
              "name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':wallet_params/2"
            },
            {
              "name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization':from_rpc/1"
            },
            {
              "name": "'Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription':verify/2"
            }
          ],
          "repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
          "vendor": "ZenHive",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "configurations": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "<p>Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires <code>subscription_access_key_private_key</code> in the Tempo <code>method_config</code>. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.</p>"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires `subscription_access_key_private_key` in the Tempo `method_config`. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires subscription_access_key_private_key in the Tempo method_config. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer's signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer."
        }
      ],
      "cpeApplicability": [
        {
          "nodes": [
            {
              "cpeMatch": [
                {
                  "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                  "versionEndExcluding": "0.16.2",
                  "versionStartIncluding": "0.14.0",
                  "vulnerable": true
                }
              ],
              "negate": false,
              "operator": "OR"
            }
          ],
          "operator": "AND"
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "E.FU"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "remediation developer",
          "value": "E.FU"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "coordinator",
          "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
        }
      ],
      "dateAssigned": "2026-09-15T15:20:31.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "<p>Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.</p>\n<p>The payer signs a Tempo <code>KeyAuthorization</code> over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. <code>MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3</code> in <code>lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex</code> pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. <code>MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4</code> deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, <code>claim_activation</code> succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.</p>\n<p>This issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.</p>"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo `KeyAuthorization` over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3` in `lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex` pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4` deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, `claim_activation` succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-60",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "supportingMedia": [
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/html",
                  "value": "<p>An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry.</p>"
                },
                {
                  "base64": false,
                  "type": "text/markdown",
                  "value": "An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry."
                }
              ],
              "value": "An attacker who obtains a payer's subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client's own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer's wallet and re-authorize the server's access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry."
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.2,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
          },
          "format": "CVSS",
          "scenarios": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "GENERAL"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-294",
              "description": "CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z",
        "orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "shortName": "EEF"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "GitHub Advisory",
          "tags": [
            "related",
            "vendor-advisory"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-p9fv-9w58-95x2"
        },
        {
          "name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-87119",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html"
        },
        {
          "name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-87119",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119"
        },
        {
          "name": "Introducing commit db464df in ZenHive/mpp",
          "tags": [
            "related"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78"
        },
        {
          "name": "Fix commit 4b6eaec in ZenHive/mpp",
          "tags": [
            "patch"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "INTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "mpp Tempo subscription key authorization is not bound to the issuing challenge, allowing a captured activation credential to be replayed"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
    "assignerShortName": "EEF",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-87119",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-09-11T18:00:02.032Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}