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CVE-2026-68494

📛 CVE Title

jackson-core: Async parser maxNumberLength bypass via chunked digit accumulation (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-18401 / GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq)

Description

The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for CVE-2026-18401 (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomplete. This record covers the remaining bypass. The earlier fix wired validateIntegerLength() into a new _setIntLength() helper and invoked it wherever the integer portion of a number is decided: a terminator byte arrives, a '.' or 'e'/'E' is seen, or input ends inside a fully buffered value. It was not invoked on the attacker-relevant path where the parser runs out of input while still inside the MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS minor state and returns NOT_AVAILABLE to the caller. As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, keeps the parser inside MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS indefinitely. _textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment() grows the accumulator on every chunk while validateIntegerLength() is never called. The accumulator is bounded only by maxStringLength (20 MiB by default) rather than by maxNumberLength (1000 by default), an amplification of roughly 20,000x over the documented limit. Because Java char values occupy two bytes, a single connection can be driven to approximately 40 MiB of heap before the validator finally fires when the value completes. The equivalent fraction-path code is correct: _finishFloatFraction() calls _setFractLength() before its NOT_AVAILABLE return. The missing call affects the integer-digit paths in _startPositiveNumber(), _startNegativeNumber() and _finishNumberIntegralPart() in NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase. Impact: reactive frameworks such as Spring WebFlux/Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon and Vert.x feed inbound HTTP or gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive, which is precisely the chunked-feed shape required. Operators who set StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength expecting it to cap memory per number value do not get that guarantee; memory accumulates per concurrent connection and attacker-controlled concurrency can exhaust the JVM heap. The synchronous parsers (UTF8StreamJsonParser, ReaderBasedJsonParser) and the async parser operating on complete input are not affected. Exploitation requires only the ability to stream data to a parsing endpoint; no privileges or user interaction are needed. This issue affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.7, and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.3, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-core from 3.0.0 through 3.1.3. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because StreamReadConstraints -- which defines the maxNumberLength setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 states the affected 2.x range without a lower bound. The 2.22.x and 3.2.x release lines are not affected: those branches were created after the fix commit landed on 2026-05-21 and therefore contain it from their initial releases (2.22.0, tagged 2026-06-03, and 3.2.0, tagged 2026-06-08).

Overview

State
PUBLISHED
Assigner (CNA)
HeroDevs
CVSS severity
HIGH
CVSS score
CVSS 8.7 / 10 8.7 8.7 / 10
CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Effective score
8.7 / 10 HIGH source: CNA overview
CWE(s)
CWE-770
Reserved
2026-07-30
Published
2026-08-04 14:39 UTC
Last updated
2026-08-05 01:39 UTC
Source
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/main/cves/2026/68xxx/CVE-2026-68494.json
Linked Threat
CVE-2026-68494 — jackson-core: Async parser maxNumberLength bypass via chunked digit accumulation (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-18401 / GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq)

Affected products (2)

VendorProductVersionsPlatforms
FasterXML jackson-core 2.15.0 (affected), 2.18.8 (unaffected), 2.19.0 (affected), 2.21.4 (unaffected)
FasterXML jackson-core 3.0.0 (affected), 3.1.4 (unaffected)

Vendor references (7)

References embedded in the original CVE record by the assigning CNA.

Web references (0)

DuckDuckGo results ranked by threat-intel / vendor advisory domains. Generated by the 🔎 Find references (web) button above — same flow as the Remediations search.

No web references attached yet.

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Raw JSON

The full cvelistV5 record. Download as CVE-2026-68494.json.

{
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                "id": "CVE-2026-68494",
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                "timestamp": "2026-08-04T17:53:50.672098Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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              "value": "<p>The fix released in jackson-core 2.18.6 and 2.21.1 for <b>CVE-2026-18401</b> (GHSA-72hv-8253-57qq, number length constraint bypass in the non-blocking parser) is incomplete. This record covers the remaining bypass.</p><p>The earlier fix wired <tt>validateIntegerLength()</tt> into a new <tt>_setIntLength()</tt> helper and invoked it wherever the integer portion of a number is <i>decided</i>: a terminator byte arrives, a <tt>.</tt> or <tt>e</tt>/<tt>E</tt> is seen, or input ends inside a fully buffered value. It was not invoked on the attacker-relevant path where the parser runs out of input while still inside the <tt>MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS</tt> minor state and returns <tt>NOT_AVAILABLE</tt> to the caller.</p><p>As a result, an attacker who streams JSON to a non-blocking parser in many small chunks, without ever sending a terminator byte, keeps the parser inside <tt>MINOR_NUMBER_INTEGER_DIGITS</tt> indefinitely. <tt>_textBuffer.expandCurrentSegment()</tt> grows the accumulator on every chunk while <tt>validateIntegerLength()</tt> is never called. The accumulator is bounded only by <tt>maxStringLength</tt> (20 MiB by default) rather than by <tt>maxNumberLength</tt> (1000 by default), an amplification of roughly 20,000x over the documented limit. Because Java <tt>char</tt> values occupy two bytes, a single connection can be driven to approximately 40 MiB of heap before the validator finally fires when the value completes.</p><p>The equivalent fraction-path code is correct: <tt>_finishFloatFraction()</tt> calls <tt>_setFractLength()</tt> before its <tt>NOT_AVAILABLE</tt> return. The missing call affects the integer-digit paths in <tt>_startPositiveNumber()</tt>, <tt>_startNegativeNumber()</tt> and <tt>_finishNumberIntegralPart()</tt> in <tt>NonBlockingUtf8JsonParserBase</tt>.</p><p><b>Impact:</b> reactive frameworks such as Spring WebFlux/Reactor, Quarkus, Helidon and Vert.x feed inbound HTTP or gRPC bytes to the async parser as they arrive, which is precisely the chunked-feed shape required. Operators who set <tt>StreamReadConstraints.maxNumberLength</tt> expecting it to cap memory per number value do not get that guarantee; memory accumulates per concurrent connection and attacker-controlled concurrency can exhaust the JVM heap. The synchronous parsers (<tt>UTF8StreamJsonParser</tt>, <tt>ReaderBasedJsonParser</tt>) and the async parser operating on complete input are not affected.</p><p>Exploitation requires only the ability to stream data to a parsing endpoint; no privileges or user interaction are needed.</p><p>This issue affects <tt>com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-core</tt> from version 2.15.0 through 2.18.7, and from 2.19.0 through 2.21.3, and <tt>tools.jackson.core:jackson-core</tt> from 3.0.0 through 3.1.3. Versions prior to 2.15.0 are not affected, because <tt>StreamReadConstraints</tt> -- which defines the <tt>maxNumberLength</tt> setting -- was first introduced in jackson-core 2.15.0, so no such constraint exists to be bypassed in earlier releases. Note that GHSA-r7wm-3cxj-wff9 states the affected 2.x range without a lower bound.</p><p>The 2.22.x and 3.2.x release lines are not affected: those branches were created after the fix commit landed on 2026-05-21 and therefore contain it from their initial releases (2.22.0, tagged 2026-06-03, and 3.2.0, tagged 2026-06-08).</p>"
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